Wednesday, April 30, 2014

Kim Krawiec's class on Taboo Trades

If you're interested in repugnant transactions, Kim Krawiec's webpage for her class at Duke on Taboo Trades is a great resource, as are her blog posts on the subject.

Tuesday, April 29, 2014

The market for affairs

Here's the latest on the growing 'infidelity economy', facilitated by the website Ashley Madison, about which I've blogged before.

Adultery is good for your marriage – if you don’t get caught, says infidelity website boss As global membership to the world’s biggest infidelity site soars to over 24 million, its founder explains the international appeal of adultery

"Famed for its catchy motto – “Life is short. Have an affair” – the dating service is free for women but paying for men.
...
"The website is currently in the throes of a rapid global expansion: since launching in Canada on Valentine’s Day in 2002, it has attracted more than 24 million members in 37 countries, with South Korea launched last week."

Monday, April 28, 2014

Repugnant transaction watch: New Hampshire Senate votes to repeal anti-adultery law

Here's the story, which comes with this map of states with anti-adultery laws:

"Adultery isn't just a crime in the eyes of your spouse. In 21 states, cheating in a marriage is against the law, punishable by a fine or even jail time.

The New Hampshire state Senate voted Thursday to repeal its anti-adultery law, sending the bill to Gov. Maggie Hassan, who says she's likely to sign it into law. Under the law the Legislature voted to repeal, adultery is a Class B misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of up to $1,200.

"I don't think there's any appetite in New Hampshire to use police powers to enforce a marriage," state Rep. Tim O'Flaherty, the bill's sponsor, said during a public hearing last month.

Last year, Colorado repealed its anti-adultery law.

States' anti-adultery laws are rarely enforced, a vestige of our country's Puritanical beginnings, says Naomi Cahn, a law professor at the George Washington University Law School."

Sunday, April 27, 2014

Law clerk hiring

Over at Concurring Opinions a little while ago was this :The Law Clerk Hiring Process – An Interview with Federal Judge Thomas Ambro

Question: How far in advance do you select your clerks?  Some federal judges are now hiring two years in advance?  What is your current practice?
Answer:  Right now (March 2014) I have all positions filled for the 2014-’15 and the 2015-’16 terms.  I also have two clerks committed for the 2016-’17 term. My typical lead time for a clerk is two years. That may mean that a clerk will be at least a year removed from law school when she or he begins working in my chambers. That time is usually spent in another clerkship (almost always a District Court clerkship, though on two occasions it has been another Circuit Court clerkship), with a law firm, or sometimes both another clerkship and work in a law firm.
....
"In addition to letters of recommendation, I welcome calls from recommenders. That tells me that the recommender is willing to put her or his reputation on the line for the applicant, something I value highly. It is also a great shortcut to my becoming aware of good applicants.
Question: Apart from typos or grammatical errors, what is the most common mistake that applicants make?
Answer: In addition to believing that a high-profile recommender is preferable to one who knows you better, the most common mistake I observe is when an applicant feigns interest in a particular judge. When the hiring plan was in place, you could discover that very quickly. If calls or emails by judges to an applicant were not to be made before a set time on a particular day and I got my calls or emails sent out timely, I could tell who was interested by how quickly they responded. If an applicant got back to me within half an hour, she or he was interested.  If that person got back to me hours later, I was “low on their totem pole.” Now that the hiring protocols are discontinued, it becomes harder to know who is interested. That is yet another reason why I try to get as much information as I can from persons who recommend applicants.
...
Question: I see that as of February 13, 2014, the Administrative Office of the Courts has discontinued the Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan. How do you feel about that?
Answer: I wish that there would be a plan in place. The hiring plan that was in place had many flaws, including making hiring season a frenetic chase for information and significant gaming of the system. That said, there was at least some organization.  I wish judges would be willing to consider something akin to the match system that exists for those in the medical profession. There would be a period for interviewing applicants (preferably after the 2L grades are out), both the judges and the applicants would prioritize their preferences and submit them to a central place, and those preferences would be dealt with by an algorithm in a computer program. No doubt that system could be “gamed” as well—for example, by having a recommender or other school official gauge a judge’s interest in an applicant, and vice versa, before the preference picks are submitted. That is not bad, however, as it is a good way to determine which applicants are truly interested in clerking for me.

Saturday, April 26, 2014

NAS Research Briefings, 2014

 I'm in Washington DC today and will give a short talk at the National Academy of Sciences, along with several other new members.

Saturday April 26 - Research Briefings
A Sampling of the Work of Members Elected in 2013: Gregory P. Asner, Terry A. Plank, Alvin E. Roth, Robert D. Schreiber, Kristi S. Anseth and Stephen R. Quake.

Later in the day will be the induction ceremony, which I gather will be webcast live at www.nasonline.org beginning at 8:00 pm (Eastern Daylight Time--5pm Pacific for you Californians...).

Sadly, Dale Mortensen, the other economist elected to the NAS in 2013, passed away on January 9, 2014.

Friday, April 25, 2014

Iranian blog with ads for selling kidneys

Here's a website (in Persian) in which prospective kidney sellers advertise.

Google translate worked well enough to give me an idea of what the ads say; here are some of them translated by Afshin Nikzad...

The first line of each ad is bold, and has the following format:

Name (gender), Age, Blood type, Price.

Manizhe (female), 22, AB, $14.5K
single, athlete, bachelors in psychology.
Due to financial needs, I'm selling my kidney.

Massoume (female), 45, A+, negotiable price
Hello. I am a 45 year old woman, bachelors in business administration,
fluent in English, can work with computers, experience of work in a
real estate agency. I migrated from Tehran to a village in Mazandaran
6 month ago. I can't find any job fitting my work experience, and have
spent all my savings in the past 6 month. I am willing to sell an organ
(to save my dignity).
contact: 09376606455, http://zh32329292.blogfa.com

Sarah (female), 30, A+, negotiable price
urgent, urgent, urgent, urgent, urgent, urgent
I need to sell my kidney because I am in a lot of debts, and I am
broke [bankrupt].
Contact: 09385786869

unknown, 23, B+
I am in serious need of money, I am getting homeless; soon please.
please text your offered price. I really need money. Can travel to any
where, the buyer is responsible for all the expenses.
Contact: 09306890335

vahid (male), 28, A+, $20K
from Tehran. completely healthy. doesn't smoke or drink.
want to sell my kidney for financial problems.

Shahin (male), 24
Hello. I am in charge of the family since my father is ill. It has been
very difficult to go at work and study at the same time, I have quit
university since a few months ago. I'm really tired of this situation.
Please offer a fair price, cause I am in need; I am doing this cause I
see no other way.

? (female), 22, A+, negotiable price
Hello, I am a 22 year old woman, and I need to sell my kidney for my
college expenses. athlete. Can travel to any where in Iran. Price is
negotiable.
Contact: 09308665458.

Maryam (female), 25, AB+, $26K
healthy. need the money to pay debts.
The buyer is responsible for all other expenses.
contact: 09189978478

Amin (male), unknown, unknown, $8K
Hello. express sale. My child had eye-surgery and is in hospital right
now. I need to pay the expenses before the surgery. The price is $8K.
Sorry that I am writing like the dealers.
With best wishes for kidney patients.

Ali (male), 22, A+, negotiable price
For serious financial problems, and for my father's surgery, I need to
sell my kidney.
Contact: 09359818234

Amir (male), 41, A+
in urgent need to sell my kidney. I have two families and 8 children, I
am in debt because of my housing rents.
Contact: 09335751908

Milad (male), 19, O+, $40K
I have been under a lot of pressure in life, and it made me do such a
thing [selling his kidney] in this age. I hope no one would ever
experience a similar situation.
Very healthy. If you are determined to buy, the price is negotiable.
contact: 09337339240, http://miladmadise@yahoo.com

mojtaba (male), 31, O+, $8K.
very healthy.
Blood type: o+
Price: $8K"

Thursday, April 24, 2014

X-STEM symposium: Promoting STEM fields to K-12 Students, April 24

Getting more American kids interested in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields seems like a worthwhile endeavor.

X-STEM Extreme STEM Symposium - Top Scientists and Inspiring Engineers Speak to K-12 Students - Thursday, April 24, 2014 / Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington DC -
Here's an article that initially brought it to my attention, since it used market design as an example:
What This Life-Saving Innovation in Mathematics and Economics Can Teach Students About STEM

It's connected to the US Science and Engineering Festival held this weekend in the same venue.

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

"What have we learned from market design?" now freely available from the EJ

My 2008 paper What have we learned from market design? is now out from behind the subscription wall and freely available from the EJ. (It may have been available for some time, but I just noticed it...)  Here's the pdf version.

Abstract

This article discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behaviour. I will draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labour markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.
The Economic Journal Volume 118, Issue 527, pages 285–310, March 2008

Tuesday, April 22, 2014

More on circumcision

Circumcision is a medical procedure that is also a traditional religious ritual for Jews and Muslims. There are also those who regard it as a repugnant transaction that should be banned, either because of questions about whether it serves a medical purpose, concern about elective procedures on children (an issue of consent, or in some readings, abuse), and antipathy to Jews and Muslims. (In California, a potential coalition to ban circumcision came apart when some of the organizers revealed strong anti-semitic inclinations, and in fact a 2011 law put a stop to the movement: New California law prohibits circumcision bans)
************
In Israel the anti-semitic component of proposed European bans is regarded as a political issue.

Knesset produces film defending circumcision
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4485174,00.html 

"After Council of Europe uses Jewish director's documentary to specify risks of religious ritual, Israeli parliament creates film featuring Jewish and Arab hospital directors voicing their support for medical advantages of circumcision"
**************

Recently some new medical evidence suggests that circumcision should be regarded as akin to child vaccination: Circumcision Benefits Outweigh Risks, Study Reports

"The authors conclude that the benefits — among them reduced risks of urinary tract infection, prostate cancer, sexually transmitted diseases and, in female partners, cervical cancer — outweigh the risks of local infection or bleeding. Several studies, including two randomized clinical trials, found no long-term adverse effects of circumcision on sexual performance or pleasure.
...
“Male circumcision is in principle equivalent to childhood vaccination,” said the lead author, Brian J. Morris, emeritus professor of medical sciences at the University of Sydney. “Just as there are opponents of vaccination, there are opponents of circumcision. But their arguments are emotional and unscientific, and should be disregarded.” ******

Prior posts on efforts to ban circumcision here.

Monday, April 21, 2014

The FCC's upcoming incentive auction, and I propose a new adjective (Milgromesque)

I've blogged before (here) about the FCC's incentive auction being designed by Paul Milgrom and the team he's assembled at Auctionomics. Now it's on the FCC blog, in a post that makes me think we may need to introduce a new adjective into market design. But first, here's the FCC post:

 Getting the Incentive Auction Right, by: Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman

"Few FCC policies have generated more attention than the Incentive Auction. “Groundbreaking,” “revolutionary,” and “first-in-the-world” are just a few common descriptions of this innovative approach to making efficient, market-driven use of our spectrum resources.

Such attention is warranted. The Incentive Auction is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to expand the benefits of mobile wireless coverage and competition to consumers across the Nation – particularly consumers in rural areas – offering more choices of wireless providers, lower prices, and higher quality mobile services.

Spectrum is a finite public resource, and refers to the public airwaves that carry all forms of wireless communication Americans use every day. Twenty-first century consumers in both rural and urban areas of our country have a seemingly insatiable appetite for wireless services, and thus, for spectrum.

Getting the Incentive Auction right will revolutionize how spectrum is allocated. By marrying the economics of demand (think wireless providers) with the economics of current spectrum holders (think television broadcasters), the Incentive Auction will allow market forces to determine the highest and best use of spectrum.

More immediately, the Incentive Auction will deliver tremendous benefits for U.S. consumers across the country.

In developing such an auction, we must also be guided by the rules of physics. Not all spectrum frequencies are created equal. Spectrum below 1 GHz – such as the Incentive Auction spectrum – has physical properties that increase the reach of mobile networks over long distances. The effect of such properties is that fewer base stations and other infrastructure are required to build out a mobile network. This makes low-band particularly important in rural areas. A legacy of earlier spectrum assignments, however, is that two national carriers control the vast majority of low-band spectrum. As a result, rural consumers are denied the competition and choice that would be available if more wireless competitors also had access to low-band spectrum.

Low-band physics also makes this slice of spectrum essential in urban areas, since it permeates into buildings better than does high-band spectrum. With more and more Americans opting for wireless-only connectivity, they should not run the risk of being unable to place a 911 call from the interior of a building just because their wireless company has the wrong spectrum.

While many factors go into determining the quality of wireless service, access to a sufficient amount of low-band spectrum is a threshold requirement for extending and improving service in both rural and urban areas.

As part of the Incentive Auction process, we will also make available on a nationwide basis spectrum for unlicensed use (think Wi-Fi). With the increased use of Wi-Fi, this spectrum has also become congested. Opening up more spectrum for unlicensed use provides economic value to businesses and consumers alike.

Whether television broadcasters participate in the Incentive Auction will be purely voluntary, but participation in the Incentive Auction does not mean they have to leave the TV business. New channel-sharing technologies offer broadcasters a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for an infusion of cash to expand their business model and explore new innovations, while continuing to provide their traditional services to consumers. We will ensure that broadcasters have all of the information they need to make informed business decisions about whether and how to participate.

Yesterday, I provided my fellow Commissioners a draft Report and Order that will determine many significant issues and policy decisions related to the Incentive Auction. The Commission will also make additional decisions to implement details pertaining to the Incentive Auction in the coming months.

Reaching this stage is a major accomplishment, and was only possible thanks to outstanding work of public servants from across the FCC.

A policy that has never been tried before comes with the perception of risk. We all know, however, that risk is the partner of reward. I will continue working with my fellow Commissioners, FCC staff, and all other interested parties to minimize the risk and maximize the reward of the Incentive Auction. I am confident we will get this right, and the rewards will be great for all Americans."
*********

Now for that new adjective, prompted by the first sentence of chairman Wheeler's post:

Mil·grom·esque: adjective. of or related to market design. “Groundbreaking,” “revolutionary,” and “first-in-the-world.”

First Known Use of MILGROMESQE

2014

Rhymes with MILGROMESQE

*****************
Update: Paul Milgrom writes (in an email whose subject line is "Evan Kwerel"):

Hi Al:
Thanks for your friendly review of the incentive auction, but while I am excited about my role as the consulting team leader, you give me far too big a share of the credit. And, I don't even mean the contributions of the amazing professors on my Auctionomics team -- Jon Levin, Ilya Segal and Kevin Leyton-Brown -- without their huge contributions, our part of this project would not be possible. What they have done is very important, but among the many folks in and out of the FCC who have contributed to this enormous project, the biggest economics hero is Evan Kwerel, who not only had the vision and chutzpah to push for a full market solution to the problem of spectrum reallocation, but also the insight to get the property rights settled in a way that enables competition among broadcasters who offer to relinquish their their broadcast licenses for cash.
The property rights are an absolutely essential and widely under-appreciated part of this story! Until 2012, there was disagreement and confusion about what rights the broadcasters had to their licenses: Did they own them? Could the FCC cancel the licenses or allow them to expire? What rights did the licensees have? In that situation, endless legal and political battles could have delayed the urgently needed spectrum reallocation for years or even decades. Instead, Evan Kwerel's vision included a political solution by which broadcasters would get the right to SOME channel in their home band (UHF or VHF), but not to their particular channel. That way, if the FCC eventually clears channels from Y to Z nationwide for wireless broadband, it can do so either by buying those rights or by buying broadcast rights from broadcasters in lower numbered channel from X to Y-1 and and retuning the broadcasters in the higher channels to use the newly available lower channels. There are lots more details to this because the engineering problems are hard ones, but the core fact is that this definition of rights makes an auction possible, and creates the possibility of a Pareto improvement with voluntary transfers of licenses. Nothing in the whole design is more important than this!
Incidentally, the political deal built into the 2012 legislation also provides a retuning fund of up to $1.75 billion to pay broadcasters who must change to another channel, plus protection to ensure that the new channel is as good for reaching viewers as the old one. The whole structure sets the stage for a Pareto improvement. If we can solve the challenges that this auction poses, I'm hopeful that it may eventually live up to the hype it is getting.

Sunday, April 20, 2014

Saturday, April 19, 2014

Tanzverbot: dancing bans in Germany on Good Friday

Sven Seuken points out this story from last year related to the German ban on dancing--Tanzverbot--on Good Friday: Ban on Dancing on Good Friday Draws Protests; Conga Line in Cologne

"FRANKFURT—Every year on Good Friday, Germany becomes a little like the fictional town in the movie "Footloose"—dancing is verboten.

The decades old "Tanzverbot," or dance ban, applies to all clubs, discos and other forms of organized dancing in all German states."

Here is Wikipedia on dancing bans

Friday, April 18, 2014

School Choice: IIPSC gets a new website

The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice has a new website. (They/we have been too busy designing school choice systems to update it in the last few years. I'm in that situation myself...)

One of its pages is on School Choice Research, which focuses on the ongoing investigations of Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak, with various colleagues, to assess the effects of school choice on student outcomes. The site presently lists the following representative papers:

 “Explaining Charter School Effectiveness.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(4): 1-27, 2013.

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Did I ruin the medical labor market?

Students of economics are sometimes surprised that many of the things they know aren't known by everyone.

So a number of people have emailed me the blog post on the Forbes magazine web site that is headlined How A Nobel Economist Ruined The Residency Matching System For Newly Minted M.D.'s, and subtitled Match Magic: How One Economist Hurt Physicians and Patients.

In it, a graduating medical student who apparently just went through the Match a month ago argues that she would have done much better if there hadn't been a match, since then she could have picked a better job, in a nicer city, at a much higher wage. And she would have been spared the expense and inconvenience of interviewing. Because in a free market you are free to choose the job you want. That's the way economists get their jobs, she concludes.
******

A quick search of the web quickly reveals that other docs have a different view of the match and of markets more generally. Here's a post from a blog site called Skeptical Scalpel, which begins this way

"A blog post entitled "How a Nobel Economist Ruined the Residency Matching System for Newly Minted MDs" appeared on the Forbes website. In it, Amy Ho, the medical student author, lists all the things she considers wrong with the National Resident Matching Program (the "Match").

"I would have commented about this on the site itself except that I have a lot to say, and in order to post a comment, I would have had to agree to allow Forbes to post tweets in my name. No, thanks.

"The title of the post is misleading. As the author noted, the Match as been around since 1952. It was established to make the process of finding a residency position fair for all graduating medical students. Alvin Roth, the economist who shared a Nobel Prize based in part on his work with the Match algorithm, simply refined the process in the 1980s and 1990s to make it even more fair. Roth didn't ruin the Match; he made it better.

"Ms. Ho blames the Match for the fact that 25% of those enrolled in 2014 failed to obtain a residency position. But even if the Match did not exist, there would still have been more than 34,000 people seeking some 26,000 positions, and 8000 doctors would not have found jobs..."
************

The NRMP data are here: http://www.nrmp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-NRMP-Main-Residency-Match-Advance-Data-Tables-FINAL.pdf 
94.4% of seniors at U.S. medical schools were matched in the main match. (Table 4).

MobLab is free for academic use.

Moblab, the experimental software for using experiments to teach economics, is now free.  This should make it easier to adopt. 

I'm one of their advisors, and I'm very enthusiastic about bringing experiments into the classroom.

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Long lasting effects of the window tax at Cambridge University


When I recently spoke at Cambridge, I took this photo at King's College.

Wikipedia has this to say, in general...
The window tax was a property tax based on the number of windows in a house. It was a significant social, cultural, and architectural force in England, France and Scotland during the 18th and 19th centuries. To avoid the tax some houses from the period can be seen to have bricked-up window-spaces (ready to be glazed or reglazed at a later date), as a result of the tax. It was introduced in 1696 and was repealed in 1851, 156 years after first being introduced. Spain and France both had window taxes as well for similar reasons.

*****************
Update: Here's a recent paper on the window tax, brought to my attention by the authors.

The Window Tax (Working Paper) A Case Study in Excess Burden

Author(s): Schwab, Robert M. and Wallace E. Oates
Publication Date: April 2014

Tuesday, April 15, 2014

New currencies that are a natural for laundering

This post isn't about bitcoin, or about prison economies, although it's closer to the second then the first. Neal Becker points me to this article about the use of Tide detergent as a currency in which you can buy drugs...(the article is mostly about how Tide has become a target for professional shoplifters who can fence it without too much difficulty):

Suds for Drugs
Tide detergent: Works on tough stains. Can now also be traded for crack. A case study in American ingenuity, legal and otherwise.

Monday, April 14, 2014

Polygamy in Kenya

Polygamy is an ancient practice in Kenya, but proposed new legislation that codifies that existing wives need not be consulted about new wives is causing some controversy. Here are two headlines that give the picture even before you start reading the stories...

Kenya’s new marriage law legalises polygamy
Kenyan Christian leaders oppose polygamy bill

From the first story:
"Kenya’s male-dominated parliament passed a new controversial marriage law not only legalises polygamy, but allows men to marry without consulting their other spouses. A majority of lawmakers - all men - even agreed to drop a proposal to ban bride price payments (usually in the form of cows). 
According to local news reports, half of Kenya’s 69 female MPs refused to take part in the debate held in the 349-member parliament last week. The women who did attend parliament stormed out in protest. 
Traditionally, first wives are supposed to give prior approval for their husband’s second marriage. According to Samuel Chepkong’a, the MP who proposed the amendment to this custom, however, no consultation is necessary because a woman who gets married under customary law already knows the marriage is open to polygamy. 
“When you marry an African woman, she must know the second one is on the way and a third wife… this is Africa,” Chepkong’a was quoted as saying by Kenya’s Capital News website. "
And from the second story:
"NAIROBI, Kenya (RNS) Christian leaders are appealing to President Uhuru Kenyatta not to sign into law a proposed new marriage bill that legalizes polygamy.
...
"But the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Kenya Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, have rejected it, saying the law will undermine Christian principles of marriage and family.
The Rev. Peter Karanja, general secretary the Kenyan church council, said the bill demeans women and fails to respect the principle of spouses’ equality in marriage."

Sunday, April 13, 2014

Videos of my Marshall Lectures at Cambridge

On February 18-19 I gave two Marshall Lectures at Cambridge:
I. Labor market clearinghouses for doctors in the U.S. and U.K.
II. Kidney exchange  (and repugnant transactions)

Three videos have now been posted at this link (both seminars, and the question and answer period): 


Both lectures are about an hour; the first lecture begins with me being introduced, I start speaking at 3:35. The Q&A is about 20 minutes.

Saturday, April 12, 2014

UNOS produces a video to inform hospitals about kidney paired donation (kidney exchange)

Video module explains features and benefits of the OPTN kidney paired donation pilot program

More than half of the eligible kidney transplant hospitals currently participate in the OPTN KPD Pilot Program, but for those that don’t, a video is now available to provide more information.  The video module (8:45) shows how staff members at a transplant hospital decide to join the program. The video overview was created by UNOS staff in close consultation with KPD Work Group leadership. It describes the mission and goals of the program, outlines the benefits of the program for hospitals, and explains how the program increases patient access to transplants.
Contact the KPD Program Manager with questions at kidneypaireddonation@unos.org.
- See more at: http://transplantpro.org/video-module-explains-features-benefits-optn-kidney-paired-donation-pilot-program/#sthash.DNbvVu8D.dpuf


"The module was created by UNOS Instructional Innovations with the goal to provide living kidney donor transplant hospitals, who are not yet participating in KPD, some information about the program.


http://transplantpro.org/video-module-explains-features-benefits-optn-kidney-paired-donation-pilot-program/ 

Friday, April 11, 2014

I talk to International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation

Normally when I talk to transplant surgeons I talk about kidney exchange, and sometimes I talk about repugnant transactions as they relate to compensating live donors. But this weekend I'll be speaking to surgeons interested in organs that can't be exchanged, like hearts. So I'll be speaking about deceased organ donation, and what economists are starting to understand about that...

Here's their press release about my talk

Thursday, April 10, 2014

Snyder lecture at UCSB, The Economist as Engineer

http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/about_us/events/snyder_lecture.html?section=this+year

UC Santa Barbara Economics


Events


Carl Snyder Memorial Lecture


This year's public lecture, The Economist as Engineer , will be held on April 10, 2014 at the University of California, Santa Barbara's Corwin Pavilion at 3:30. Admission is free. Seating is limited.

Alvin Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the 2012 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. Professor Roth specializes in game theory, experimental economics and market design.

How to bring different actors together in the best possible way is a key economic problem. Professor Roth’s research is aimed at improving real world market interaction. Through empirical studies and lab experiments, Roth and his colleagues demonstrated that stability was critical to successful matching methods. Roth used this principal to develop systems for matching doctors with hospitals, school pupils with schools, and organ donors with patients. In his lecture, Professor Roth will explore the fascinating world of applied game theory, encouraging his audience to think differently about everyday markets.
******************

Update:

Wednesday, April 9, 2014

Competitive college admissions gets yet more competitive, as students apply to more schools

The NY Times has the story: Led by Stanford’s 5%, Top Colleges’ Acceptance Rates Hit New Low

"Enrollment at American colleges is sliding, but competition for spots at top universities is more cutthroat and anxiety-inducing than ever. In the just-completed admissions season, Stanford University accepted only 5 percent of applicants, a new low among the most prestigious schools, with the odds nearly as bad at its elite rivals.

"Deluged by more applications than ever, the most selective colleges are, inevitably, rejecting a vast majority, including legions of students they once would have accepted. Admissions directors at these institutions say that most of the students they turn down are such strong candidates that many are indistinguishable from those who get in.
...
"Bruce Poch, a former admissions dean at Pomona College in Claremont, Calif., said he saw “the opposite of a virtuous cycle at work” in admissions. “Kids see that the admit rates are brutal and dropping, and it looks more like a crapshoot,” he said. “So they send more apps, which forces the colleges to lower their admit rates, which spurs the kids next year to send even more apps.”

"For most of the past six decades, overall enrollment boomed, while the number of seats at elite colleges and universities grew much more slowly, making them steadily more selective. Enrollment peaked in 2011, and it has dropped a bit each year since then, prompting speculation that entry to competitive colleges would become marginally easier. Instead, counselors and admissions officers say, the pool of high-achieving applicants continues to grow, fed partly by a rising number from overseas.

"At the same time, students send more applications than they once did, abetted by the electronic forms that have become nearly universal, and uniform applications that can make adding one more college to the list just a matter of a mouse click. Seven years ago, 315 colleges and universities accepted the most widely used form, the Common Application; this year, 517 did.

"Students applying to seven or more colleges made up just 9 percent of the applicant pool in 1990, but accounted for 29 percent in 2011, according to surveys by the National Association for College Admission Counseling, and counselors and admissions officers say they think the figure has gone higher still.
...
"A generation ago, it was rare for even highly competitive colleges to offer places to fewer than 20 percent of their applicants. In 2003, Harvard and Princeton drew exclamations of dismay (from prospective applicants), envy (from other colleges) and satisfaction (from those they accepted) when they became the first top universities to have their admission rates dip below 10 percent. Since then, at least a dozen have gone below that threshold.

"This was the second year in a row that Stanford had the worst odds of admission among top colleges, a title that in previous years was usually claimed by Harvard. This year, by the April 1 deadline for most colleges to send admission notices, Harvard and Yale had accepted about 6 percent of applicants, Columbia and Princeton about 7 percent, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Chicago about 8 percent. (Some rates will increase by a few tenths of a percentage point as colleges accept small numbers of applicants from waiting lists.)

"Several universities, including Stanford, Duke, Northwestern, Cornell and the University of Pennsylvania, had admission rates this year that were less than half of those from a decade ago. The University of Chicago’s rate plummeted to a little over 8 percent, from more than 40 percent."

Tuesday, April 8, 2014

Matching in Maastricht this week

There's lots of matching in Maastricht this week, here's the program (and here are the abstracts of papers)




Program


Wednesday, April 9
14:00-14:30 Registration: Ad Fundum14:30-14:45 Introduction to the Meeting: H0.06/Aula
14:45-15:30 Attila Tasnadi (Corvinus University of Budapest):Axiomatic Districting (joint with Clemens Puppe)
15:30-16:15 Coffee Break: Ad Fundum
16:15-17:00 Alexander Westkamp (Maastricht University):Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking (joint with Lars Ehlers)
17:00-17:45 Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne):Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems (joint with Jonathan Newton)
Thursday, April 10
09:00-09:45 Baharak Rastegari (University of Glasgow):Size Versus Truthfulness in the House Allocation Problem
09:45-10:30 Jay Sethuraman (Colombia University):
Rationing Problems in Bipartite Networks (based on joint work with Herve Moulin, Shyam Chandramouli, Olivier Bochet, and Rahmi Ilkilic)

10:30-11:15 Coffee Break: Ad Fundum
11:15-12:00 Serge Galam (Sciences Po and CNRS):From Majority Rule Voting to Democratic Dictatorship
12:00-12:45 Friedrich Pukelsheim (University of Augsburg):Negative Voting Weights in the Former Electoral System for the German Bundestag
12:45-14:15 Lunch: Ad Fundum
14:30-15:15 Flip Klijn (IAE-CSIC and Barcelona GSE):A Many-to-Many “Rural Hospital Theorem” (joint with Ayse Yazici)
15:15-16:00 Szilvia Papai (Concordia University):Reasonably and Securely Stable Matching (joint with David Cantala)
16:00-16:30 Coffee Break: Ad Fundum
16:30-18:15 MC meeting: H0.04
18:30-19:30 Excursion in Maastricht: Start at entrance Onze Lieve Vrouwe Kerk (Church of Holy Mary)
19:30 Dinner at Harbour Club, Bassin, Maastricht
Friday, April 11
9:30-10:15 Albin Erlanson (Lund University):Strategy-Proof Package Assignment (joint with Karol Szwagrzak)
10:15-11:00 Christian Geist (Technical University of Munich):Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving (joint with Felix Brandt)
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break: Ad Fundum
11:30-13:00 Rump Session13:00 Lunch: Ad Fundum
And if you go, be careful, I understand that Maastricht can be slippery.

Race based admissions, and the search for plaintiffs

The NY Times has an interesting story that touches on various transactions that some people regard as repugnant...in this case, race-based university admissions, and lawyers advertising for clients...

The story focuses on Edward Blum, the legal activist who has been at the forefront of the battle against using race as a criterion in admissions to American colleges and universities. Now he's looking for plaintiffs who think that some universities might be ignoring recent rulings.

"Admissions letters have just gone out, and there is no particular reason to think the court’s decision in Fisher v. University of Texas affected how students were selected. And the lawsuits Mr. Blum predicted have not materialized.
There are reasons for that, Mr. Blum told me last week. One is that it is hard to find plaintiffs willing to call attention to having been rejected by a prestigious institution, to blame that rejection on race discrimination and to persevere through years of litigation.
...
But Mr. Blum does not give up easily. He is launching a series of websites seeking plaintiffs.
“Were you denied admission to the University of North Carolina?” one asks. “It may be because you’re the wrong race.”
...
"Civil rights movements have long recruited plaintiffs, and so the sites may be said to be part of a proud tradition. But some may detect a whiff of the personal injury lawyer about them."

Monday, April 7, 2014

Fast and slow on changing views of formerly repugnant transactions: same sex marriage, and marijuana

Readers of this blog know that I've been following the change in public attitudes towards a number of formerly repugnant transactions. Recently two articles in the NY Times caught my eye, about the speed of change, and cautious attitudes even among supporters of change, regarding the legalization of marijuana, and same sex marriage. Basically both of these are gaining momentum, and mainstream politicians and corporate leaders sometimes feel caught in the middle.

Despite Support in Party, Democratic Governors Resist Legalizing Marijuana

"LOS ANGELES — California voters strongly favor legalizing marijuana. The state Democratic Party adopted a platform last month urging California to follow Colorado and Washington in ending marijuana prohibition. The state’s lieutenant governor, Gavin Newsom, has called for legalizing the drug.

But not Gov. Jerry Brown. “I think we ought to kind of watch and see how things go in Colorado,” Mr. Brown, a Democrat, said curtly when asked the question as he was presenting his state budget this year.

At a time of rapidly evolving attitudes toward marijuana legalization — a slight majority of Americans now support legalizing the drug — Democratic governors across the country, Mr. Brown among them, find themselves uncomfortably at odds with their own base."

*************
And here's a recent column by Frank Bruni: The New Gay Orthodoxy

"TO appreciate how rapidly the ground has shifted, go back just two short years, to April 2012. President Obama didn’t support marriage equality, not formally. Neither did Hillary Clinton. And few people were denouncing them as bigots whose positions rendered them too divisive, offensive and regressive to lead.

But that’s precisely the condemnation that tainted and toppled Brendan Eich after his appointment two weeks ago as the new chief executive of the technology company Mozilla. On Thursday he resigned, clearly under duress and solely because his opposition to gay marriage diverged from the views of too many employees and customers. “Under the present circumstances, I cannot be an effective leader,” he said, and he was right, not just about the climate at Mozilla but also, to a certain degree, about the climate of America.

Something remarkable has happened — something that’s mostly exciting but also a little disturbing (I’ll get to the disturbing part later), and that’s reflected not just in Eich’s ouster at Mozilla, the maker of the web browser Firefox, but in a string of marriage-equality victories in federal courts over recent months, including a statement Friday by a judge who said that he would rule that Ohio must recognize same-sex marriages performed outside the state.

And the development I’m referring to isn’t the broadening support for same-sex marriage, which a clear majority of Americans now favor. No, I’m referring to the fact that in a great many circles, endorsement of same-sex marriage has rather suddenly become nonnegotiable. Expected. Assumed. Proof of a baseline level of enlightenment and humanity. Akin to the understanding that all people, regardless of race or color, warrant the same rights and respect."

Sunday, April 6, 2014

Classifying Economics Nobels

Someone at the Nobel Foundation has compiled a list of Nobel prizes by fields, with a definition of "field" taken from the one-line prize citation. It makes for a lot of fields...so it may be subject to change. Here's what it looked like recently:

Applied game theory (1)

"for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design"

Development economics (2)

"for their pioneering research into economic development research with particular consideration of the problems of developing countries"
"for their pioneering research into economic development research with particular consideration of the problems of developing countries"

Econometrics (8)

"for having developed and applied dynamic models for the analysis of economic processes"
"for having developed and applied dynamic models for the analysis of economic processes"
"for his clarification of the probability theory foundations of econometrics and his analyses of simultaneous economic structures"
"for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples"
"for his development of theory and methods for analyzing discrete choice"
"for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility (ARCH)"
"for methods of analyzing economic time series with common trends (cointegration)"
"for their empirical analysis of asset prices"

Economic governance (2)

"for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons"
"for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm"

Economic growth (1)

"for his empirically founded interpretation of economic growth which has led to new and deepened insight into the economic and social structure and process of development"

Economic growth theory (1)

"for his contributions to the theory of economic growth"

Economic history (3)

"for his empirically founded interpretation of economic growth which has led to new and deepened insight into the economic and social structure and process of development"
"for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change"
"for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change"

Economic psychology (2)

"for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty"
"for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms"

Economic sociology (1)

"for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour"

Economics of information (5)

"for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information"
"for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information"
"for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information"
"for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information"
"for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information"

Experimental economics (2)

"for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty"
"for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms"

Financial economics (8)

"for their pioneering work in the theory of financial economics"
"for their pioneering work in the theory of financial economics"
"for their pioneering work in the theory of financial economics"
"for a new method to determine the value of derivatives"
"for a new method to determine the value of derivatives"
"for their empirical analysis of asset prices"
"for their empirical analysis of asset prices"
"for their empirical analysis of asset prices"

Game theory (6)

"for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games"
"for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games"
"for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games"
"for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis"
"for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis"
"for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design"

General equilibrium theory (3)

"for their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory"
"for their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory"
"for having incorporated new analytical methods into economic theory and for his rigorous reformulation of the theory of general equilibrium"

Industrial organization (1)

"for his seminal studies of industrial structures, functioning of markets and causes and effects of public regulation"

Input-Output analysis (1)

"for the development of the input-output method and for its application to important economic problems"

Institutional economics (2)

"for their pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena"
"for their pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena"

International and regional economics (1)

"for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity"

International economics (2)

"for their pathbreaking contribution to the theory of international trade and international capital movements"
"for their pathbreaking contribution to the theory of international trade and international capital movements"

International macroeconomics (1)

"for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas"

Labor economics (3)

"for their analysis of markets with search frictions"
"for their analysis of markets with search frictions"
"for their analysis of markets with search frictions"

Macroeconometrics (3)

"for the creation of econometric models and the application to the analysis of economic fluctuations and economic policies"
"for their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy"
"for their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy"

Macroeconomics (9)

"for their pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena"
"for their pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena"
"for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy"
"for his analysis of financial markets and their relations to expenditure decisions, employment, production and prices"
"for his pioneering analyses of saving and of financial markets"
"for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy"
"for their contributions to dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency of economic policy and the driving forces behind business cycles"
"for their contributions to dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency of economic policy and the driving forces behind business cycles"
"for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy"

Management science (1)

"for his pioneering research into the decision-making process within economic organizations"

Microeconomics (4)

"for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour"
"for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory"
"for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory"
"for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory"

National income accounting (1)

"for having made fundamental contributions to the development of systems of national accounts and hence greatly improved the basis for empirical economic analysis"

Partial and general equilibrium theory (2)

"for the scientific work through which he has developed static and dynamic economic theory and actively contributed to raising the level of analysis in economic science"
"for his pioneering contributions to the theory of markets and efficient utilization of resources"

Public finance (1)

"for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making"

Theory of market institutions (1)

"for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy"

Theory of optimal allocation of resources (2)

"for their contributions to the theory of optimum allocation of resources"
"for their contributions to the theory of optimum allocation of resources"

Welfare economics (1)

"for his contributions to welfare economics"

Welfare theory (2)

"for their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory"
"for their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory"